The price game

When Ron Johnson took over as CEO of J. C. Penney, one of his most sweeping changes was to move away from the constant sales and coupons to a more straightforward pricing model. Not surprising considering he came from Apple where they hold one sale a year, on Black Friday, and not even a great one at that.​

But J. C. Penney is not Apple, and the price game each is playing is different.

Mr. Johnson explained a similar logic when he moved the chain toward simplified pricing. In January 2012, while introducing his new plan to investors, the press and vendors, Mr. Johnson said that in the previous year, the company held 590 sales events; almost three-quarters of the stuff it sold was marked down 50 percent or more.

But here’s the thing: customers weren’t actually paying less. The chain just kept raising the prices that customers saw on the racks, and then discounted those prices during promotions. Why keep playing a game that is expensive and troublesome for the seller and a mirage for the consumer?

J. C. Penney was not the first retailer to be astonished by the brilliance of this realization. In 2006, Macy’s had a similar idea after acquiring the coupon-happy May department stores. It decided to “retrain” those customers, as its chief financial officer put it at the time, by drastically cutting coupons. By 2007, it had abandoned that strategy. Its chief executive acknowledged that pulling back on coupons was Macy’s biggest mistake in its acquisition.

Even Walmart, which actually does pull off the trick of “everyday low prices” in its domestic stores, is finding it hard to convert consumers to a single-price model in countries like Brazil and China, where retailers give deep discounts on a few main products, then mark up the rest, said Mark Wiltamuth, an analyst at Morgan Stanley.

The problem, economists and marketing experts say, is that consumers are conditioned to wait for deals and sales, partly because they do not have a good sense of how much an item should be worth to them and need cues to figure that out.

Just having a generically fair or low price, as Penney did, said Alexander Chernev, a marketing professor at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, assumes that consumers have some context for how much items should cost. But they don’t.

Price strategy has to be supported throughout the organization. For Apple to have one price for its items means they must enforce that price through all of its distribution partners, and it must also create advertising that reinforces the premium quality of the goods. And of course, the products must be good enough to justify a no discount policy.​

​One thing is for certain: once you go sale, it's tough to go back (once you go red, it's hard to go black?). Companies that consider a sale or discount strategy should do so carefully. Once customers expect a regular cadence of sales or discounts (e.g. Restoration Hardware's bi-annual bath sales, or Bed Bath and Beyond's ubiquitous 20% off coupons) they orient their entire behavior around that pattern and won't easily be persuaded to buy at full price ever again.

Purple Pricing

It shouldn't be surprising, perhaps, that one of the more innovative sports ticket pricing schemes to be put into practice comes out of Northwestern University, not traditionally a sports powerhouse. ​Last month, they launched Purple Pricing for select men's basketball games for the rest of this season.

Essentially, Purple Pricing is a form of Dutch Auction​, in which the prices of the item being sold are lowered until you hit the price at which all the items can be sold at that price. Then everyone who has bid above that price pays the lower price, the same as everyone else. The incentive, in the case of Northwestern men's basketball tickets, is to find that price at which they can sell out the game and also to capture some revenue back from the secondary market, from companies like Stubhub.

For the buyer, as soon as the price reaches one you're willing to pay, there's not reason to wait. The price can only go lower from there, it will never rise.​

Purple Pricing is a joint effort between the Northwestern athletic department and economists Jeff Ely and Sandeep Baliga. The experiment will provide Northwestern with a ton of data to maximize revenue.

Theirs is not a perfect Dutch Auction, however, as there is an artificial price floor. Northwestern will not let the Dutch Auction prices fall below the price that season ticket holders paid. In the future, they could do away with season tickets altogether and use Dutch Auctions to price every game.

The first two games Northwestern tried this with offered a good divergence in demand to test out the system: a desirable game against #16 ranked Ohio State, and a much less desirable game against Penn State. The attendance against Ohio State was 7,036, while against Penn State it was just 5,517. It would have been interesting to see where the price would have landed for the Penn State game had there been no price floor in effect.

Alas, Northwestern lost both games. Some problems can't be so easily solved with economics.​

Pricing anomalies

There are many positives to living in San Francisco, but parking is not one of them. It's the hardest city to find parking in that I've ever lived in. Someone wrote an entire book on the subject.

I went to Amazon to buy a copy of said book. Amazon didn't have a copy, so I checked the 3rd party seller tab for a new copy. The first seller offered it for $9.97 a copy, but the other two sellers wanted $75 and $92.20 plus shipping! This for a book that's sold off of its website for $12.95 plus shipping.

Sellers are always looking for out of print situations to try to shift the price of media up. I once sold a copy of the Criterion Collection DVD of Salo, which was out of print at the time, for $220 on Amazon.com. Someone should start a Tumblr of products which have gone into short supply and thus have exorbitant prices from Amazon's 3rd party seller community.