True run and gun

A long time ago, I wrote about Grinnell College's Division III basketball team which plays runs an innovative offense which coach Dave Arseneault calls The System:

94S + 47 3's + 33%OR + 25SD + 32 TO's = W

The ‘Formula for Success’ has withstood the test of time. Since 1996, whenever the Pioneers have attempted 94 shots, with half of those shots from behind the arc, offensive rebounded 33% of their missed shot attempts, taken 25 more shots than their opponent and forced the opposition into committing 32 turnovers, they have won at nearly a 95% clip. Grinnell accomplishes all five of these goals in slightly over one-third of their contests.

While the ‘formula’ has been consistent through the years, the strategies employed to achieve these goals have been altered. During the early years, a new group of five players usually stayed on the court for 2 ½ minutes at a time. The length of playing shifts has been reduced considerably during the last few years and it is now a regular practice to replace all five players on the first whistle after 35 seconds have elapsed off the game clock. Also, in those early years, it was customary practice to rotate three groups of five players. Currently, Coach Arseneault uses two playing groups- each incorporating a total of eight players.

Regardless of the length of shifts or number of groups used, there is still only one way to accomplish all five of the aforementioned goals: Your team must be committed to getting a shot off and getting the ball back every 12 seconds.

Grinnell is still at it, leading all of Division III basketball in scoring per game. Tonight, Grinnell player Jack Taylor scored 109 points in a 173-123 victory over Crossroads. Last year he scored 138 points in a game.

Who do you want taking the last shot?

TrueHoop looked at the last 5 minutes of 2012 NBA playoff games to try to answer the question: who should take the last shot, your superstar or a random wide open teammate?

And you know what we found? The Archangel, Hero Ball offense isn't the best. Though it may not be as fun, if your star has a passing lane to a wide open shooter, that's almost certainly better.

Through last night's play, “go-to players” are shooting 41.8 percent (71-170), including 25.6 percent (11-43) from 3.

Other players who happen to be open are shooting 54.2 percent (58-107) on field goal attempts, including 36 percent (18-50) from 3.

That is a massive difference. Teams shooting 41.8 percent from the floor almost never beat teams shooting 54.2 percent. It is a strong reflection on the power of competing against no defense. 

You get a sense for why this might be watching NBA players warm up for a game. When they're shooting without anyone on them, NBA players make a shockingly high percentage of their shots.

Another entertaining data point to support this case: this video of Gilbert Arenas's 3-point shooting contest with teammate DeShawn Stevenson in practice in 2007. Both shot 100 3-pointers, Arenas using one hand from college 3-point range, DeShawn using two hands from NBA range. The outcome is entertaining, but just as impressive is the sheer number they make.

ShotScores

The great Kirk Goldsberry has pulled back the curtains on a new measure of basketball shooting prowess which he calls ShotScores. 

By overlaying players' shot constellations, we can estimate the expected total number of points that an average NBA shooter would produce, based on where he took his shots; then we can compare a particular player's actual yield against it.

When you put it like that, it sounds so basic, yet it's been difficult until now to measure something like this. But no more. We can finally factor in degree of difficulty when judging a player's shooting ability.

Goldsberry ran the numbers for last season, and the top three players in ShotScores were the following: 

1. LeBron James
2. Kevin Durant
3. Stephen Curry

Always helpful when you create a new statistic and it passes the eye test. Counter-intuitive results are more intriguing, but it's helpful for adoption when your results mesh with the opinion of NBA scouts and analysts. 

Incidentally, the NBA signed a deal with STATS Inc. to install SportVU cameras in all of its stadiums for the upcoming season, so we're about to enter a Golden Age of basketball analysis. I'd argue that the NBA, of all the major U.S. sports leagues, has released the most comprehensive set of statistics to the public through its website. I could spend hours just combing through that stuff, and it will only get better if they include SportVU data.

As an example, Henry Abbott of Truehoop highlights a few new basketball strategies that have become accepted wisdom in the past few years thanks to new analysis.

Kobe vs MJ

"One of the biggest differences between the two stars from my perspective was Michael's superior skills as a leader," Jackson writes. "Though at times he could be hard on his teammates, Michael was masterful at controlling the emotional climate of the team with the power of his presence.  Kobe had a long way to go before he could make that claim. He talked a good game, but he'd yet to experience the cold truth of leadership in his bones, as Michael had in his bones."

“One of the biggest differences between the two stars from my perspective was Michael's superior skills as a leader. Though at times he could be hard on his teammates, Michael was masterful at controlling the emotional climate of the team with the power of his presence. Kobe had a long way to go before he could make that claim. He talked a good game, but he'd yet to experience the cold truth of leadership in his bones, as Michael had in his bones.”

"No question, Michael was a tougher, more intimidating defender," Jackson writes. "He could break through virtually any screen and shut down almost any player with his intense, laser-focused style of defense."

Those are excerpts from Phil Jackson's new book Eleven Rings: The Soul of Success, coming out Tuesday, ​in which he compares Kobe Bryant to Michael Jordan.

​This bit was especially revealing.

Jackson also revealed that the sexual assault charges levied against Bryant in 2003 temporarily clouded his outlook of the Lakers star. The situation "cracked open an old wound" because Jackson's daughter Brooke had been sexually assaulted by an athlete in college.

"The Kobe incident triggered all my unprocessed anger and tainted my perception of him. ... It distorted my view of Kobe throughout the 2003-04 season," Jackson writes. "No matter what I did to extinguish it, the anger kept smoldering in the background."

I am definitely going to pick up that book. Too bad Phil Jackson hasn't coached more of our generation's leading players. I'd love his insight into, say, Lebron James or Tim Duncan.

The latest NBA strategic battle

"A lot of the defensive strategies you see now are a natural evolution from rule changes," says Houston GM Daryl Morey, in reference to the league's decision a decade ago to abandon illegal defense rules and essentially allow zone defenses. "First the defense evolved by overloading the strong side, and now the offenses are evolving to beat that."

The Heat are the most obvious example of a team that has torn down and rebuilt its entire offense over 18 months to counter defenses committed to clogging the lane, sending an extra defender toward the ball, and forcing offenses into second, third, and fourth options. It's no coincidence Miami plays in the same conference as Boston and Chicago — the two teams most associated, via Tom Thibodeau, with that strangling defense. Thibodeau didn't invent this system, and he's loath to take any public credit for it, but coaches, scouts, and executives all over the league agree he was the first coach to stretch the limits of the NBA's newish defensive three-second rule and flood the strong side with hybrid man/zone defenses. Other coaches have copied that style, and smart offenses over the last two seasons — and especially this season — have had to adapt. The evolution will have long-lasting consequences on multiple fronts — on the league's entertainment value, the importance of smart coaching, and the sorts of players that GMs seek out in the draft and via free agency.

Zach Lowe on how NBA offenses are evolving to counter the trendy Thibodeau-style defenses which have become so popular and effective. Smart throughout.

Lowe notes that a key in countering these types of defenses is being able to pass the ball well. This matches what I've seen with offenses that have given the Bulls problems in the past. Because the Bulls attack the strong side so aggressively, a team that can quickly swing the ball all the way back to the other side of the court quickly often gets open 3-pointers against the Bulls.

​To beat a team like Miami, with its habit of sending a whole series of fast, good defenders at the ball from among Lebron, Wade, Battier, Chalmers, Cole, and Anthony, quick passing is the only way to win. You can't expect to beat them off the dribble which is one reason the Bulls struggled so much in their last playoff meeting. Once they put Lebron on Derrick Rose and neutralized Rose's dribble penetration, the Bulls offense choked. When the Bulls have had success against the heat, it is with quick passing, not dribble penetration.

Just as football has gone through a series of back and forth chess moves between offenses and defenses (Buddy Ryan 4-6, West Coast offense, Cover 2, spread offense, option read), basketball is in the midst an inflection point too. 

The fairly rapid transitions in these cycles make sports an underrated way to study evolutionary systems.